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1115 1991 BEGAN, the U.S. economy was in
the second quarter of a downturn in aggregate
economic activity. Real output, as measured by
the gross national product (real GNP), had fallen
in the fourth quarter of 1990 at a 2.5 percent
annual rate; the first quarter of 1991 would
turn out to be even worse, with output falling
at a 2.8 percent annual rate. As the year wore
on, the pace of real output growth turned posi-
tive, although it seemed to stall somewhat
toward the fourth quarter. The recession and
the subsequent slow recovery put pressure on
the primary policymaking group of the Federal
Reserve, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC), to take action to spur greater output
growth in the short term.’ This paper provides
a chronologically based assessment of the Com-
mittee’s policymaking in this environment. As
such, it provides a case study in the making of
monetary policy during the recovery phase of
the business cycle.
In order to put FOMC decision making into
context, a framework for discussion is outlined.
The framework is intended to provide a basis
for thinking about how monetary policy is made
and why, in a broad brush sense, certain con-
cerns reign paramount in Committee delibera-
tions. The framework is meant to be qualitative
and suggestive, so as not to belabor the techni-
cal details of theoretical arguments.
Generally speaking, the FOMC has well-defined
goals but faces two daunting uncertainties when
making decisions. One is that the immediate
past, current and future path of real output is
not easily surmised by considering current data.
This inhibits the Committee’s ability to assess
the state of the economy in a timely fashion
and, thus, to make short-run policy decisions.
Secondly, the Committee has a difficult time
assessing its own policy stance at a point in
time, primarily because alternative measures of
policy actions sometimes send conflicting signals.
The next section provides the framework for
understanding FOMC decision making. The chro-
nology is presented in the subsequent section.
The final section provides summary comments.
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To understand the FOMC’s decision making in
1991, a general framework or reference point is
useful in order to put into focus the arguments
presented for various policy actions. For the
most part, FOMC members and the Board staff,
the primary participants in these meetings, pre-
sent broad points of view and avoid technicali-
ties. Disagreement, when it occurs, is often a
matter of the interpretation of recent economic
‘See the shaded insert on the following page for a discus-
sion of the structure of the FOMC in 1991.The Organization of the FOMC
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developments, but sometimes concerns the
amount of weight to attach to certain broadly
theoretical arguments. Before beginning an anal-
ysis of Committee deliberations, it is therefore
helpful to consider, in a nontechnical way, the
ideas that underlie Committee debate. A frame-
work of this sort was presented in Bullard (1990),
and this section briefly describes that approach.
The Committee states its goals for monetary
policy repeatedly in documents released to the
public throughout the year. In particular, at the
conclusion of each meeting, the Committee is-
sues a directive which contains, with other in-
formation, a statement of the following type:
The Federal Open Market Committee seeks
monetary and financial conditions that will
foster price stability, promote a resumption
of sustainable growth in output, and contrib-
ute to an improved pattern of international
transactions.~
This statement of objectives has three parts.
The first goal, to foster price stability, is based
on the idea that FOMC policy, over long periods
of time, can influence the inflation rate. The se-
cond objective, to promote sustainable growth,
is associated with the idea of countercyclical
monetary policy, in particular that the FOMC
can influence real output over short time hori-
zons, say, less than a year.3 The third part of
the statement of objectives, an improved pattern
of international transactions, is more oblique,
2Federal Reserve press release, March 29, 1991, p. 22.
The Federal Open Market Committee releases its record of
policy actions (in the remainder of this article, simply “the
Record”) for a particular meeting shortly after the next
regularly scheduled meeting. The press releases referred
to in the remainder of this article are dated May 17, 1991;
July 5, 1991; August 23, 1991; October 4, 1991; November
8, 1991; December 20, 1991; and February 7, 1992. All
press releases will be referred to by month.
~Thestatement of objectives quoted above is noteworthy
for the inclusion ofthe words “a resumption of.” Available
information suggested that real output was declining at the
time this statement was released, and hence the more
standard phrase, “. --promote sustainable growth in out-
put,” was modified. Later in the year, when real output
again appeared to be growing, albeit rather slowly by
historical standards, the term “resumption” was dropped.and beginning about midyear, this phrase was
dropped from the Committee’s statement.
Therefore, for the last five meetings of the year,
the statement of objectives was:
The Federal Open Market Committee seeks
monetary and financial conditions that will
foster price stability and promote sustainable
growth in output.4
In this article, focus will be placed on this last
statement of objectives, as the price stability
and real output goals are consistently mentioned
throughout the year, and the international goal
is not.
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A widely held view among economists is that
inflation, over long time periods, is closely relat-
ed to the rate of money growth within a coun-
try. In fact, the idea is that the rate of money
growth eventually translates directly to the rate
of inflation. The theory, which dates to Hume
(1742), is broadly supported by international
cross-section evidence, which shows that coun-
tries choosing high rates of money growth over
a decade or more tend to have the highest infla-
tion rates. The United States, for instance, has
experienced an average annual rate of inflation
of 5.4 percent in the 1980s, which was associat-
ed with an average annual money growth (M2)
rate of 7.5 percent. Iceland, on the other hand,
experienced 32.1 percent average annual infla-
tion over the same period, associated with a
money growth rate of 38.2 percent. Similarly,
Mexico had 50.1 percent average annual infla-
tion associated with money growth of 45.9 per-
cent. A look at other countries in which data
are available reveals similar patterns.
Of course, despite the fact that such views
are widely held, the theory is incomplete. It is
not clear, for instance, what constitutes a suffi-
ciently long time period. In addition, as the ex-
amples given above indicate, the relationship is
far from exact, even over a decade or more. Fi-
nally, the theory by itself gives no indication of
what to expect from, say, a short but intense
burst of money growth. Despite these caveats,
the theory and evidence are sufficiently strong
to suggest that, in the long run, inflation is a
policy-induced phenomena, and thus that con-
trol of inflation is an important aspect of central
bank policymaking.
The notion that monetary policy actions can
significantly affect the growth of real output
over short time horizons, such as a quarter or a
year, is deeply seated among macroeconomists.
It is also controversial and largely unresolved.
Nevertheless, the Committee has generally
adopted the view that monetary policy actions
do have material effects on real output growth
within the following few quarters. It is not
difficult, for instance, to find statements in the
Record that attest to members’ views in this
regard. For instance, at the February meeting,
there was talk that “inadequate monetary stimu-
lus -.. could fail to cushion possible further
deterioration in the economy.”3 Similarly, in
March, “if the economy was indeed near its
recession trough, additional easing would not be
necessary;” in May, “the System’s earlier easing
actions . .. had provided a good deal of insur-
ance against cumulative further weakening in
business activity;” and in July, “policy was posi-
tioned to foster a sustainable economic expan-
sion.”°Statements of a similar sort can be found
throughout the year.
Since the Committee operates in an environ-
ment in which the short-term effects of mone-
tary policy on real output are taken for granted,
in this paper these effects are simply assumed
to exist and to be substantive, with due notice
to the ongoing debate on that topic in academic
circles. Generally speaking, it will be assumed
that an “easing” of monetary policy is associated
with a teniporary gain in output (relative to
what would have occurred without the easing)
a few quarters hence, and that a “tightening” of
policy has the reverse effect.
It is important to note that these postulated
real output effects occur only with a lag, which
many economists suppose is at least one quarter
and may be as long as a year or more. The no-
tion of lagged policy effects is an important
theme in Committee debates, as it forces meni-
bers to form opinions about the path of real
output several quarters into the future. Such
forecasting is notoriously difficult. The inability
to forecast accurately tends to produce uncer-
4February press release, p. 16. tRespectively, the May press release, p. 12, the July press
release, p. 12, and the August press release, p. 14. 5March press release, p. 15.Al
tainty among policymakers when choosing ap-
propriate short-run policy actions.
If the members of the FOMC were concerned
solely with long-run policy, as would be suggest-
ed by the available theory and evidence on in-
flation, they would presumably have much less
concern for current forecasts of real activity
over the next few quarters. But the Committee
is not concerned solely with inflation, as their
statement of objectives attests; therefore, the
Committee members and Board staff have an
acute concern for the daily goings-on of the
U.S. economy. In fact, the Record consists pri-
marily of a recitation of recent economic devel-
opments as captured in various measurements
produced by the Federal Reserve or the U.S.
government, often with an associated inference
about what seems to be in store for real activi-
ty. The idea that policy actions taken today will
affect real output in the not-too-distant future
drives the concern for up-to-the-minute informa-
tion about the status of economic activity. Short-
run forecasting is a necessary ingredient of any
strategy based on the notion of significant
short-run monetary policy effects on real output.
Measuring the .t’niiey Stance
The Committee also has some difficulty in as-
sessing the policy stance at a point in time be-
cause various measures of the thrust of policy
can give conflicting signals. The Record and
other Federal Reserve documents describe poli-
cy in terms of whether it is “tight” or “easy.”
These vague terms, which have a long history
of use within the Federal Reserve, cannot be as-
sociated directly with System actions. This has
created the situation in which two observers,
and indeed Committee members themselves, can
easily disagree about the thrust of monetary
policy at a point in time. To see how this might
be so, consider how most monetary policy ac-
tions are implemented.
Commercial banks must maintain reserves
against certain types of deposits. Reserve posi-
tions are maintained on a two-week basis, so
that a particular depository institution might
find itself either over- or under-supplied with
reserves at a point in time. These reserves are
traded among banks on a daily basis in the fed-
eral funds market, and the interest rate in this
market is the federal funds rate. The Federal
Reserve can supply or drain reserves from the
system through intervention in this market.
Such open market operations are carried out by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York based on
the directives from the FOMC.
Given a conventional downward-sloping de-
mand for reserves, the Federal Reserve can in-
crease (decrease) the federal funds rate by
decreasing (increasing) the supply of reserves.
‘rotal reserve supply is subject to close control
by the System. A standard analysis relates the
sum of total reserves and currency, the mone-
tary base, and measures of the money supply,
such as M2, by a proportional factor called the
money mu1rip!ier.~Thus, increases in total
reserves, increases in the money stock and
decreases in the federal funds rate are simply
different aspects of the same mechanism in this
simple framework and are associated with the
term “ease.““I’ight” policy would involve move-
ments of these variables in opposite directions.
Since, generally speaking, lower long-term in-
terest rates are associated with higher rates of
investment and greater consumer purchasing,
which in turn are associated with higher levels
of real output, easy policy is often thought to
be stimulative in the short run. Tight policy is
viewed as having the reverse effect. Of course,
the federal funds rate is only a short-term in-
terest rate, and there might be some question
whether movements in a short rate will actually
be reflected in the spectrum of interest rates.
Theories on this topic abound, and, as will be
apparent in the following chronology, members
of the Committee sometimes disagree about the
net interest rate effects of a lower federal funds
rate.
‘The essential problem in practice is that total
reserves, the federal funds rate and the money
supply can, and sometimes do, give conflicting
signals about whether monetary policy is actual-
ly easy or tight. Casual consideration of the
above analysis suggests why this might be so. In
particular, the demand for reserves is probably
shifting over time in response to the level of
economic activity, implying that the federal funds
rate could rise or fall even when reserves are
constant. Additional reserves, therefore, need
not signal a lower federal funds rate. M2 growth
might also be affected by vagaries in real activity.
7For a recent discussion, see Garfinket and Thornton
(1991).45~
‘rhese and other concerns produce the funda-
mental problems in assessing the FOMC’s policy
stance at a point in time.
The Federal Reserve also occasionally lends
reserves to commercial banks directly through
the discount window. The rate on these loans,
the discount rate, is administered by the Board
of Governors, and the FOMC plays no official
role in changing it. ‘rhe volume of loans made
by the Federal Reserve at the discount rate is
relatively small, so that the direct impact of a
change is viewed as relatively unimportant. In
the past, however, the discount rate has been
set somewhat below the prevailing federal
funds rate, so that, in 1991, when the federal
funds rate declined through most of the year, a
lower discount rate was sometimes taken by
market participants as a signal of a lower feder-
al funds rate at some point in the future. In
fact, in 1991, the Committee often allowed a
lower discount rate to show through to the fed-
eral funds rate, meaning that the funds rate
was allowed to fall when the discount rate was
lowered. Therefore, discount rate changes play
an important role in the following chronology,
even though the discount rate is not, strictly
speaking, under the jurisdiction of the FOMC.
Based on the simple framework outlined
above, the three indicators of policy that will be
considered in this paper are the federal funds
rate, the M2 monetary aggregate and total
reserves.8 The behavior of these indicator varia-
bles in 1991 is summarized in figures 1-3; refer-
ence will be made to these graphs throughout
the chronology. Figures 4-7 provide a synopsis
of the recent behavior of several other key
variables—namely, real output, total nonfarm
payroll employment, industrial production and
consumer confidence.
The framework that will be used to summa-
rize FOMC decision making is now comnplete.
The Committee states its major objectives fre-
quently: to control inflation and maintain sus-
tained growth in real output. International
evidence suggests that low inflation rates can be
achieved by maintaining low rates of money
growth. The real output effects of monetary
policy are less certain, but summaries of Com-
mittee deliberations indicate that members be-
lieve temporary easing can mitigate downturns
in economic activity. Pursuit of this objective re-
quires an assessment of the current and future
path of real output, but knowing whether the
incoming data signal a change in direction for
the economy is complicated by lags in data
releases and errors in economic forecasts. To
summarize FOr~ICpolicy actions, some measure
of the monetary policy stance is required. Since
various measures sometimes suggest differing
interpretations of the thrust of monetary policy,
several indicators will be employed.
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On the whole, the chronology in this section
indicates that the FOMC became increasingly
pessimistic about the prospects for a sustained
recovery as 1991 progressed, and this led to
particularly aggressive easing actions late in the
year.°In the first meetings of 1991, when a
substantial amount of information suggested a
decline in real output, members were neverthe-
less hopeful that easing implemented since the
December 1990 meeting would be enough to lay
the groundwork for a moderate recovery begin-
ning in the spring and summer. In fact, several
directives in the first half of the year called for
steady policy with no bias toward ease, although
some easing actions actually were implemented
according to the Record.b0 Beginning in August,
in an atmosphere of increasing concern about
the strength of the recovery, the Committee
turned to asymmetric language toward ease in
the directive. The trend toward easing actions
peaked in the November directive, with the
Committee voting to support immediate ease
with additional bias toward ease during the in-
termeeting period.
As emphasized in the chronology, however,
merely outlining the content of Committee direc-
tives does not provide a complete summary of
monetam’y policy during this period. At times,
for instance, the thrust of policy is open to in-
terpretation. In addition, policy changes are
sometimes implemented via other methods, such
as intermeeting conference calls, or in concert
with discount rate changes.
tWhite thereare many other possible indicators of mone-
tary policy, in this article these three are the only ones
considered.
~Asummary of FOMC actions in 1991 is contained in
table 1.
‘°TheCommittee sometimes uses so-called asymmetric lan-
guage in the directive, which is one way of making policy
changes contingent on intermeeting developments. This
phenomena is also sometimes described as “bias” in the
directive.Table 1
Important Dates in the Chronology of 1991 FOMC Actions
The following summary is based solely on statements in the Record regarding policy actions.
See the text for a discussion of measures of the thrust of policy.
Early January. An easing action is implemented.
February 1. The Board of Governors approves a reduction in the discount rate to 6 percent from
6.5 percent. The EOMC allows the entire amount of the cut to show through to the federal funds
rate.
February 5-6. The FOMC meets. The target range for M2 growth is kept at 2.5 to 6.5 percent.
The directive calls for an unchanged policy with some bias toward ease depending on intermeet-
ing developments.
Early March. An easing action is implemented.
March 26. The FOMC meets. The directive calls for an unchanged policy without bias.
End ofApril- The Board of Governors cuts the discount rate from 6 percent to 5.5 percent. The
FOMC allows part of the 50 basis-point declineto show through to the federal funds rate.
May 14. The EOMC meets. The directive calls for an unchanged policy without bias.
July 2-a The EOMC meets. The target range for M2 growth is kept at 2.5 to 6.5 percent. The
directive calls for an unchanged policy without bias.
Early August An easing action is implemented.
August 20. The FOMC meets. The directive calls for an unchanged policy with some bias toward
ease depending on intermeeting developments.
Mid-September. The Board of Governors lowers the discount rate from 5.5 percent to 5 percent.
The FOMC allows part of the decline to show through to the federal funds rate.
October 1. The FOMC meets. The directive calls for an unchanged policy with some bias toward
ease depending on intermeeting developments.
End of October. An easing action is implemented.
November 5. The FOMC meets. The directive calls for immediate ease with bias toward addition-
al ease depending on intermeeting developments.
November 6. The Board of Governors lowers the discount rate to 4.5 percent. An easing action
is implemented in concert with the discount rate cut.
Early December. An easing action is implemented.
December 17. The FOMC meets. The directive calls for an unchanged policy with bias toward
ease depending on intermeeting developments.
December 20. The Board of Governors towers the discount rate by a full percentage point to
3.5 percent. The FOMC allows partial show-through to the federal funds rate.1,7
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Intermeeting Growth of Total Reserves1
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In keeping with standard practice and Con-
gressional requirements, the FOMC took up a
review of long-range policy at the February
meeting. As in the past, most of the discussion
focused on target ranges for monetary and debt
aggregates, primarily the M2 monetary aggregate.
In July 1990, the Committee had tentatively set
the 1991 target range for M2 growth at 2.5 to
6.5 percent, measured from the fourth quarter
of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 1991. As can
be seen from figure 2, the recent 13-week
growth rates for M2, at the time of this meet-
ing, had mostly been below the target band.”
In recent years, the FOMC has pursued a
strategy of gradually reducing the target ranges
for Ma growth, usually in increments of 0.5
percent per year, with the idea of eventually at-
taining a range consistent with price stability.12
At this meeting, however, ‘most of the mem-
bers indicated a preference for affirming the
ranges that had been established on a tentative
basis in July.”’~The essential reason for the in-
terruption in the usual sequence was the weak
economy, in particular, that “lowering [the tar-
get rangel. --could lead to concerns about the
System’s objective of fostering an upturn in bus-
iness activity.”” On the other hand, increasing
the ranges) perhaps in an effort to show reces-
sion-fighting resolve, was also viewed with sus-
picion, since it “could raise questions about the
System’s commitment to its anti-inflationary
goals.”” After further debate on these points,
the Committee agreed to a directive calling for
maintenance of the tentative Ma target ranges,
that is, with the lower end at 2.5 percent and
the upper end at 6.5 percent.”
In terms of short-run policy, that is, policy for
the immediately upcoming intermeeting period,
~Ofcourse, it is not necessarily of concern that the 13-week
M2 growth rates sometimes tall outside the target band; it
is the growth rate over the entire year that is of im-
portance.
“March press release, p. 14.
14March press release, p. 15.
‘~Marchpress release, p. 15.
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the developments since the previous FOMC
meeting were an important consideration. The
December 1990 directive had called for some in-
itial easing along with additional easing should
conditions warrant. The Board of Governors,
which exercises authority over discount rate
changes separately from the FOMC, voted to
lower the discount rate to 6.5 percent immedi-
ately following the December meeting, and, ac-
cording to the Record, some of this decline was
allowed to show through to the federal funds
rate.” Further easing followed in January, and,
when the Board of Governors approved a fur-
ther discount rate cut on February 1 to 6 per-
cent, the entire amount of the cut was allowed
to show through to the federal funds rate.” As
figure 1 shows, the federal funds rate, although
relatively volatile, had dropped approximately
100 basis points during the intermeeting period.
By this measure, dramatic ease had taken place
during the intermeeting period.
The intermeeting growth rate of total reserves,
graphed in figure 3, also seemed to indicate
substantial ease in the period since the December
meeting. The annualized growth rate for this
period was in excess of 30 percent. Ma growth
had begun to pick up somewhat by February,
with the 13-week growth rate moving slightly
higher than 2.5 percent at the time of the meet-
ing. According to the Record, “the continuing
weakness in M2, - - appeared to reflect in part
heightened concerns about the financial condi-
tion of many depository institutions in the wake
of the closing of privately insured banks and
credit unions in Rhode Island and the failure of
the Bank of New England.””
At the time of this meeting, it appeared that
real output had declined in the fourth quarter
of 1990 and was on a path of further decline in
the current quarter. In particular, total nonfarm
payroll employment fell in January, on the heels
of a December decline. Industrial production
declined sharply in the fourth quarter of 1990,
as had capacity utilization. Consumer spending,
“partly reflecting [al lackluster... holiday sea-
son,” was weak in the fourth quarter.2°These
factors were somewhat offset by a relatively
strong nonagricultural export performance.21
The Board staff’s forecast for real output pre-
pared for the February meeting suggested that
“some further decline in economic activity” was
likely in the near term!2 The staff forecast as-
sumed that the war in the Persian Gulf, which
was just getting under way, would be short-
lived, perhaps lasting a few months, and that
further disruption of oil supplies would be
avoided for the foreseeable future. The economy
was expected to begin growing again “subse-
quently,” aided by export growth, falling oil
prices and interest rates, and improved con-
sumer confidence.”
Committee members saw the economic situa-
tion at the time of the February meeting as
marked by “heightened... uncertainties,” due in
part to the outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf.24
In general, members saw a “relatively mild
recession followed by a moderate upturn in eco-
nomic activity. -- as a reasonable expectation.”5
“Risks,” however, “were clearly on the down-
side,” and even a “relatively long recession
could not be ruled out.”°In assessing the out-
look, members were particularly concerned
about business and consumer confidence. In-
dices of sentiment were already at low levels
and were poised, in the eyes of the Committee,
to go lower, owing not only to the unfolding
conflict in the Middle East, but also to “financial
excesses of the past decade.”~Nonetheless, not
all of the news was gloomy, as the Committee
noted that a lower spectrum of interest rates,
lower oil prices and a depreciating dollar would
probably contribute to a rebound in aggregate
activity.” On the inflation front, “several mem-
bers stressed that the slowing in monetary
growth over a period of years was likely to be
reflected increasingly in lower inflation.”
According to the Record, “the considerable
easing of monetary policy. - . [in] recent months”
encouraged members to endorse unanimously
“March press release, p. 4.
“March press release, p. 4.
“March press release, p. 6.
“March press release, p. 2.
21March press release, p. 3.
22March press release, p. 6.
‘4March press release, p. 7.
“March press release, p. 7.
2eMarch press release, p. 8.
“March press release, p. 9.
“March press release, p. 10.
“March press release, p. 13.
“March press release, p. 7.an unchanged policy for the intermeeting period
ahead.” In particular, “sufficient time had not
yet elapsed for the effects of the lower [interest]
rates to be felt in the economy or indeed to any
measurable extent in the growth of the monetary
aggregates.” While many members mentioned
sluggish Ma growth as an area of concern, most
seemed to agree with a staff analysis that sug-
gested faster rates of growth by the end of
March, given a steady policy course. Some
members, however, reiterated a call for a “rela-
tively high priority [on] achieving satisfactory
rates of growth in reserves and money.”
The degree of bias in the directive, if any, was
a slightly more contentious issue. One view held
out for a tilt toward ease in the weeks ahead,
owing primarily to “the downside risks to the
economy and the potential for inadequate mone-
tary growth.”” Some members were especially
concerned that there would be “a high premium
on avoiding any tendency for the weakness in
the economy to cumulate because [of]. --the se-
vere consequences of a potentially deep and
prolonged recession.”~An alternative view held
by some members was that, while easing might
be necessary in the future, there were “con-
siderable risks of overreacting” and that “condi-
tions for a recovery in economic activity already
appeared to be in place.” The former view,
however, carried the day, and the directive con-
tained bias toward ease, giving “special weight
to potential developments that might require
some easing during the intermeeting period.”
.Mi~tnei a? .%?e:rrh .29, 1 991.
During the intermeeting period, the bias
toward ease in the directive was acted upon.
According to the Record, “in early March, in
response to information suggesting that econom-
ic activity had continued to decline through
February, pressures on reserve positions were
eased slightly.” The indications that economic
activity was weakening further included a sharp
decline in total nonfarm payroll employment
and a fall in industrial output.’8 Accordingly,
the federal funds rate, depicted in figure 1, fell
to a level just over 6 percent by the time of the
March meeting. Money growth, as measured by
13-week Ma growth rates, continued to pick up
during this period and seemed to indicate ease
relative to previous rates, as outlined in
figure 2. According to the Record, members cit-
ed “the strengthening in M2 growth in February
and March [as] a welcome development follow-
ing an extended period of limited expansion.”3’
Total reserves, shown in figure 3, were more
puzzling during this period, as they actually
declined, indicating a net drainage of reserves
from the system instead of an injection. The
reserves measure, therefore, seemed to indicate
a relatively tight intermeeting policy.
‘rhe Board staff expected a resumption of real
output growth within a few months of the
March meeting.4°Positive factors cited included
the end of the war in the Persian Gulf (which
presumably would brighten consumer and busi-
ness attitudes), lower nominal interest rates and
oil prices, and expected improvement in ex-
ports.4’ The staff felt that “reduced availability
of credit” and “a moderately restrictive fiscal
policy” were factors restraining near-term
growth.~’
The Committee’s assessment of the outlook
was essentially in agreement with that of the
Board staff. Members were especially en-
couraged by the improvement in consumer con-
fidence at the end of the war and felt that “an
upturn in economic activity was widely expect-
ed.”’ Many members emphasized, however,
that little hard evidence of growth in real out-
put had accumulated thus far and that, in fact,
“there was some risk that the recession could
deepen considerably further.”~’Many members
did not share the staff’s optimism about a sig-
nificant contribution to the recovery coming
from export growth, as such effects were likely
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“May presscording to the Record, real output growth had
slowed in Germany and Japan, and “some weak-
ening in activity apparently had occurred in
several other major industrial countries.””
Most members supported the notion, with
regard to short-run policy action, that sufficient
easing had already taken place to foster a recov-
ery.4’ In fact, some members commented that
“the most likely direction of the next policy move
was not clear at this point and. -- caution was
needed before any action was taken.”~’In par-
ticular, further easing was a “possibility” due to
“prevailing uncertainties,” but, “if the economy
was indeed near its recession trough, additional
easing would not be necessary.”4’ Firming was
viewed as “premature,” although there might be
a “potential need to tighten reserve conditions
promptly if emerging economic and financial
conditions. --threatened progress toward price
stability.’” Given these considerations, all of the
members agreed to support a directive calling
for an unchanged policy in the weeks ahead.”
While the members “expressed a range of
views’ relating to the possible degree of bias in
the directive, the directive issued was symmet-
ric.” As noted in the Record, the symmetry
represented a deviation from the policies adopted
since July 1990, as virtually all of the directives
since that time had been biased toward ease.”
The policy shift was consistent with the “assess-
ment that the risks to the economy. --were
now more evenly balanced.”” In one view, the
recession had bottomed out, and therefore little
could be achieved through further easing. In
fact, “policy adjustments should be made only in
the event of particularly conclusive evidence. --
that the recession might be deeper. --than an-
ticipated.” An alternative view was that down-
side risks still predominated and that “the
Committee should react relatively promptly”
should real output appear to decline further.”
One member suggested that recoveries tend to
be stronger than expected, and therefore the
“[greatest] risks were in the direction of too much
ease and of persisting or increasing inflation.”
In this view, the bias in the directive should be
toward a tighter policy, especially considering
the lags in monetary policy effects. Considering
all of these views, however, the Committee
elected to issue the symmetric directive.
The Committee also discussed the interaction
between discount rate changes and open mar-
ket operations as a technical matter of operat-
ing procedure.” The policy in recent years has
been to keep the discount rate somewhat below
the federal funds rate. Discount rate changes,
which again are governed directly by the Board,
“usually had been allowed to pass through auto-
matically to the federal funds rate” in the recent
past, although there were some exceptions.”
‘rherefore, actions implemented by the Board
alone might influence open market operations
without explicit FOMC approval. Comments by
members indicated the practice of show through
should be continued, in general, “but that con-
sultation among members of the Committee
would be particularly appropriate in [some] cir-
cumstances.”° In particular, the members men-
tioned cases in which a partial show through
was more appropriate or particularly large policy
actions were being considered.”
Alerting of f .1 4, 1991
Immediately following the March FOMC meet-
ing, a steady open market policy was main-
tained.” As figure 1 shows, however, the
federal funds rate began declining immediately
after the March meeting; the Record notes, “the
rate was under downward pressure at times
from market expectations of some further eas-
ing.” At the end of April, two weeks before
the May meeting, an easing action was imple-
mented when the Board voted to reduce the
discount rate to 5.5 percent and a portion of
the drop was allowed to show through to the
federal funds rate. Federal funds traded at about
“May press release, p. 3.
“May press release, p. 11.
“May press release, p. 12.
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Quarterly money growth rates had begun to
slow at the time of this meeting, as shown in
figure 2, but remained squarely within the target
band. Reserve growth had resumed, eliminating
some of the puzzle of the sharp decline recorded
in the previous intermeeting period.
The easing action was taken in response to
“indications of [continuing] weakness in the
economy.” ‘I’he Record describes incoming
data as “mixed,” perhaps broadly suggestive that
real output growth might be flat or slightly
positive after declining in the fourth quarter of
1990 and the first quarter of 1991.” While total
nonfarm payroll employment fell again in April,
the rate of decline was less than in previous
months. Industrial output was flat in April. The
available data on foreign economies suggested
that they grew at a relatively slow pace in the
first quarter.
Calling an upswing in economic activity “immi-
nent,” the Board staff at this meeting forecast a
recovery fully under way in the summer months
of 1991 and continuing through 1992.” The
growth in real output was expected to be slower
than that experienced during other postwar
recoveries.” Restraint in the recovery was sug-
gested, according to the staff, by “the absence
of further significant impetus from net exports”
and “moderately restrictive” fiscal policy, at all
levels of government.” The staff’s changing view
on the contribution of net exports, relative to
its forecast from the previous meeting, was con-
sistent with the evidence that major foreign in-
dustrial economies continued to slow in the first
months of 1991.
The Committee “generally viewed a business
recovery in the months ahead as a reasonable
expectation.” While most members felt that
signals were “mixed,” many felt that “a variety
of developments appeared to have laid the



















factor would be the evolution of consumer and
business sentiment.” Many members seemed to
concur with the staff forecast that the strength
of the recovery was questionable, as “current
conditions did not point to major sources of
stimulus.” Some members, however, did discuss
inventory investment and housing construction
in such a role. As for inflation, “the members
continued to express confidence that the ongo-
ing effects of earlier monetary policy actions
and reduced monetary growth over an extended
period. --would tend with some lag to exert a
favorable restraining effect on prices.”
The Committee unanimously supported a
directive with the thrust of policy unchanged
from that of the previous meeting, and virtually
all members supported instructions avoiding
bias.’~At this point, in members’ eyes, “a steady
monetary policy appeared to. -. [reflect] an ap-
propriate balancing of the risks of an overly
stimulative policy that would threaten progress
against inflation versus the risks of a deepening
recession or an overly delayed recovery.”
While some members felt that the costs of a
further fall in real output were much more se-
vere than an unexpectedly strong burst of
growth, most agreed that the easing actions that
had already been taken, given the presumed
lags in effects on real output, were enough to
insure against a further downturn.” In particu-
lar, “the System’s commitment to the goal of
reducing inflation argued for a cautious ap-
proach to any further easing at a time when
the economy might be close to its recession
trough.”
The growth rate of the Committee’s primary
monetary aggregate, Ma, was a point of discus-
sion at the May meeting. The Board staff pre-
pared a report suggesting that Ma growth
would improve in the summer following a flat
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?~Julypress release, p. 12.concern that, in particular, “subnormal mone-
tary growth might be an indication that mone-
tary policy was still too tight.” For this reason,
according to the Record, “a number of members
underscored the desirability of achieving mone-
tary growth within the Committee’s ranges for
the year.”
/ /
The midyear meeting of the FOMC included a
review of long-term objectives as required by
law. The target range for M2 was the focus of
discussion. The growth of this monetary ag-
gregate was slowing at the time of this meeting,
to the point where the 13-sveek growth rate
had dropped to just over 2 percent, as illustrat-
ed in figure 2. For the year, however, M2
growth was in the middle of the target range,
thanks to faster growth rates earlier.” Neverthe-
less, members felt that the “growth of this ag-
gregate thus far in 1991 had fallen short of
what might have been expected on the basis of
historical relationships with nominal income and
interest rates.” Furthermore, “the reasons for
the shortfalls were not fully understood.” The
view of the Committee seemed to be that there
was simply a good deal of uncertainty sur-
rounding the behavior of Ma, but that “the
four-percentage point range provided adequate
leeway for any adjustments that might be need-
ed.’” As in February, the Committee decided to
leave the target range unchanged.
With regard to short-run policy, operations
had focused on maintaining the existing policy
stance since the last meeting. The federal funds
rate seemed to bear this out, as the weekly
average rate shown in figure 1 remained steady
for the most part at about 5.75 percent, except
for a 50 basis-point spike on the week of the
July meeting. According to the Record, there
was some upward pressure on interest rates in
the intermeeting period due in part to “expecta-
tions that no further easing of monetary policy
was likely in the near term.”4 While figure a
shows that M2 growth continued to slow, meas-
ured on a 13-week basis, intermeeting reserve
growth as captured in figure 3 appeared satis-
factory.
The Board staff forecast “considerable growth”
through the end of 1991.” Again at this meet-
ing, the staff felt that this phase of the recovery
would be slow relative to past experience. The
restraint was attributed, in part, to weakness in
nonresidential construction, which would be
“depressed by high vacancy rates,” and “fairly
restrictive” fiscal policy, again at all levels of
government.”
Members of the Committee “generally agreed
that a recovery very likely was under way.”
While “puzzling aspects” were noted, it was also
pointed out that “sources of strength in an eco-
nomic expansion often have been difficult to an-
ticipate near a cycle trough.” The Committee’s
policy of moderate money growth over the last
several years was expected to pay off in the
form of lower inflation in the upcoming quart-
ers.” Many members agreed with the staff
regarding the restrictive effects of fiscal policies
at all levels of government relative to past
recovery phases. In particular, “despite burgeon-
ing [federal] borrowing requirements in the
near term, cutbacks in defense spending and
other efforts to curb expenditures” had the ear-
marks of a restrictive fiscal approach.”
The Committee unanimously supported a
directive that called for an unchanged policy in
the weeks until the next meeting. According to
the Record, “an unchanged policy course [was
viewed as offering] the greatest promise of
reconciling the Committee’s goals of sustaining
the nascent business recovery while also foster-
ing further progress against inflation.”” Immi-
nent policy change was viewed as “unlikely,”
despite “obvious.., uncertainty.” Recent slug-
gishness in Ma growth, which can be seen in
figure 2 as the declining 13-week growth rates
in May and June, was a concern of some mem-
bers, who commented that perhaps “monetary
policy had not been eased sufficiently in recent
“July press release, p. 13.
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“August press release, p. 5.months.” It was pointed out, however, that
other measures, “especially... m’eserves,” seemed
to show growth that was relatively strong. Most
members felt that “the behavior of M2 ... did
not call for any policy adjustments at this
point.” In any event, the staff projected faster
M2 growth in the near future, under a presump-
tion of an unchanged policy stance.
I,
As the Committee convened in August, the
“recovery was proving to be sluggish.”~While
operations during the intermeeting period ini-
tially had been directed toward maintaining ex-
isting policy, an easing move was implemented
in early August.” One reason for the unsche-
duled action was weakness in Ma growth; as
can be seen in figure a, the 13-week growth
rates were approaching zero at the time of the
easing action and had turned negative by the
time of the meeting. By any of the measures of
the policy stance considered here, however, an
easier policy was not obvious. Federal funds,
which had been trading at about 5.75 pem’cent,
moved only slightly lower by the time of the
mneeting according to the weekly averages
graphed in figure i. Ma growth continued to
falter as the Committee convened. Intermeeting
total reserve growth was flat, perhaps suggest-
ing a relatively tight policy.
‘the Record again describes the information
on the economy at this juncture as “mixed,” hut
generally suggestive that sluggish growth in real
output would continue in the near term.” In-
dustrial production increased in July, in part be-
cause of a rise in automobile production. July
total nonfarm payroll employmnent increased
slightly, as did retail sales, but business fixed in-
vestment declined in the second quarter and
was expected to remain weak.” Interest rates
generally fell in the intermeeting period; one
reason cited, in the case of short-term Treasury
securities, was the attempted coup in the Soviet
Union.”
The Board staff forecast a “moderate expan-
sion over the next several quarters.” The
growth rate of real output for the second half
of the year, however, was now forecast to be
somewhat lower than previously suggested. The
staff outlook emphasized “a cyclical swing from
substantial liquidation to modest accumulation
in business inventories” as a stimulus for recov-
ery. As in previous forecasts, m’estrictive fiscal
policy was thought to be retarding real output
gm’owth rates from their more usual cyclical
pattern.
FOMC members saw an economy that was
“uneven,” although they appeared to agree with
the staff in principle that real output growth
would be positive over the next several quart-
ers. In particular, a “sustained expansion -- -
was still viewed as a reasonable expectation,
[but] mnany members now believed that the risks
were tilted toward the downside”” The coup
attempt in the Soviet Union, the outcome of
which was unknown at the time of the meeting,
added in the vie%v of the Committee additional
uncertainty to the outlook. Closer to home,
weakness in M2 growth was cited as “a nmtter
of increasing concern to the extent that it im-
plied. .-a faltering economic expansion.”
Again at this meeting, according to the Record,
the FOMC seemed to concur with the staff as-
sessment that fiscal policy effects would proba-
bly be “somewhat negative” for the immediate
future.”
The shift toward pessimism in the Commit-
tee’s outlook is reflected in private sector fore-
casts from August 1991 and December 1991 for
quarterly growth in real output, as illustrated in
figure 4. As of August, projections for the
fourth quarter of 1991 and the first quarter of
1992 were relatively robust, although perhaps
somewhat low relative to previous recoveries.
By December, however, the projected growth
rates for these quarters had dropped substan-
tially, far below that which might have been ex-
pected based on historical experience.
The Committee voted to issue a directive
maintaining current policy for the immediate fu-
ture but with an asymmetry toward ease. Ac-
cording to the Record, “an immediate easing
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lo2October press release, p. 11.mnove would be premature because the most re-
cent economic information, although mixed, still
suggested a moderate rate of economic expan-
sion.”103 Advocates of asymmetry argued that
“risks.., were largely on the side of a weaker-
than-projected economy” and that the Commit-
tee should “react promptly” if any cumulative
decline should become apparent.” Some mem-
bers disagreed, however, because they “were
concerned about responding to what might
prove to be short-lived fluctuations in the eco-
nomic data and anecdotal information.” Even
these members, however, could accept some
asymmetry toward ease in the directive.”
The Record indicates that members paid “con-
siderable attention” in their discussion to sag-
ging M2 growth rates.” While members found
explanations “difficult to disentangle,” some saw
the slow growth to be of “little import” if it
merely reflected shifts into alternative invest-
ment instruments that are not counted in the
broad monetary aggregates.10’ On the other
hand, the “behavior.., might be indicative
of. -. a monetary policy stance that was too
tight.” The Board staff analysis continued to
forecast some pick-up in the growth of Ma in
the near term.”
Some members suggested that, in current cir-
cumstances, the Board should emphasize move-
ments in M2 more explicitly when “guiding
possible intermeeting adjustments in policy.”
The majority, however, did not support this
idea, for at least three reasons. One was that
broad monetary aggregates like M2 were
viewed by some as “unreliable indicators” of
real output growth paths. Another was that nar-
rower measures, such as Ml and total reserves,
“might be more indicative of the underlying
thrust of monetary policy.” Finally, some mem-
bers felt that including stronger reference to
monetary aggregates in the directive might “mis-
construe the views of many members,” who
might not be willing to support a policy response
to “aberrant fluctuations” in money growth.”
teet19g~ October 1, 1991
Again, the bias in the August directive was
acted upon during the intermeeting period. The
Board voted to lower the discount rate to 5 per-
cent in mid-September and part of the 50 basis-
point decline was allowed to show through to
the federal funds rate. Accordingly, federal
funds traded at about 5.25 percent by the time
the Committee met in October, as shown in
figure 1. Monetary growth, as measured by the
13-week Ma growth rate displayed in figure 2,
was actually negative at the time of the meet-
ing, but apparently the fall in this growth rate
had stalled somewhat relative to the decelera-
tion apparent in the graph since the spring of
the year. Figure 3 indicates that intermeeting
growth in total reserves had resumed, almost
reaching the rates observed at the May and July
meetings; by this measure, policy appeared to
have been eased somewhat since August.
According to the Record, the informnation on
the economy reviewed at the October meeting
suggested a continuing recovery, but one that
was “uneven across sectors.” Total nonfarm
payroll employment had been essentially flat
since March. Industrial production had increased
in August. Consumer spending was rising, but
retail sales fell in August. Overseas, the growth
rates of the Japanese and German economies
fell in the second quarter, although real output
growth appeared to have strengthened in other
large economies.112
TiThe Board staff projected continued recovery,
tempered by downside risks and somewhat slow
relative to previous cyclical upturns because of
“persisting weaknesses in some sectors of the
economy.” In this forecast, consumer spend-
ing would be a significant positive factor, with
“a swing from inventory liquidation” providing
an “additional boost.”~Other sources of stimu-
lus included business equipment spending and
housing construction.” Dampening factors
were still seen on the fiscal policy side and also
in commercial construction, where high vacancy
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Committee members seemed to agree with the
staff prognosis, viewing the fledgling recovery
as somewhat threatened.1~~ According to the
Record, “members commented that the anecdo-
tal reports on economic conditions and on busi-
ness and consumer sentiment continued to have
a generally negative tone that did not appear to
be fully consistent with the available economic
statistics.h1
8 Reports on business attitudes in
particular seemed to suggest that key participants
in the economy thought momentum in economic
activity was stalled.” Members were concerned
about risks to the recovery arising from “finan-
cial strains in the economy” as well as slow
money growth. On the whole, however, the
Committee appeared to feel that “the prospects
remained favorable for a sustained expansion
[in economic activity] at a moderate pace over
the next several quarters.”
In the discussion about operating instructions
for the upcoming few weeks, all of the members
of the FOMC supported language leaving the
policy stance initially unchanged. According to
the Record, “the present policy stance provided
an appropriate balance between the risks of a
faltering economic expansion and the risks of
little or no progress toward price stability.”
Some previous easing had not yet filtered
through to effects on real output growth.”
Several members asserted, however, that the
Committee should remain “particularly alert to
indications of renewed weakening in business
activity,” in part because they felt a second
downturn might be less responsive to monetary
stimulus.” Other members emphasized the ad-
verse consequences of easing too much, focus-
ing on the prospect of higher long-term interest
rates due to increased inflationary expectations
which might then retard growth.” On balance,
however, a steady course proved to be the con-
sensus.
The slow growth of M2 continued to be a
concern. While somne members emphasized spe-
cial factors that might be depressing otherwise
robust growth, such as the resolution of the cri-
sis in the thrift industry, others felt that the
broad monetary aggregates “needed to be moni-
tored with special care.” As at previous meet-
ings, the Board staff continued to predict some
pick-up in the growth of Ma, even in the ab-
sence of further easing action.
As for contingencies in the directive, most of
the members “indicated a preference for a
directive that was biased at least marginally
toward easing.” The downside risks cited
earlier provided the primary justification in the
majority view. A minority preferred a symmet-
ric directive, citing likely cumulative effects
from previous easing actions as a sufficient
safeguard against further declines in real out-
put.” Nevertheless, these members indicated a
willingness to accept an asymmetric directive.”
In the discussion, some members in the majori-
ty emphasized that “there should be no strong
presumption that any easing would be under-
taken during the intermeeting period ahead.”
flier bo.g if •Vo’ rothor 5, .199.1
Because the recovery appeared to be weaken-
ing during the intermeeting pemiod, an easing
action, consistent with the bias toward ease con-
tained in the October directive, was implement-
ed at the end of October.” According to the
Record, a key concern in taking this action was
evidence on “flagging consumer and business
confidence.” ‘the federal funds rate fell after
the easing action to just above 5 percent by the
time of the November meeting. The 13-week
growth rates of M2 accelerated substantially,
even before the easing action, and turned posi-
tive during the intermeeting period. Growth for
the year remnained near the lower end of the
Committee’s range. Intermeeting total reserve
growth was substantial, hitting the second
highest level of the year, as outlined in figure 3.
All measures of the policy stance therefore
seemed to indicate at least some ease.
The Board staff, concerned about “m’ecent
reports on business and consumer confidence
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combined with other information,” continued to
forecast an expanding economy in the quarters
ahead hut made an “appreciable markdown” in
the expected rates of growth in real output
relative to past forecasts.” The staff saw the
downside risks to the forecast as “predomi-
nant.” In particular, real output was expected
to grow quite slowly over the winter months,
with the more robust growth normally associated
with cyclical upswings a possibility in the spring
of 199a or later.”~Except for the decline in the
measures of sentiment contributing to less con-
sumption than previously predicted, the staff
foresaw the same sources of strength and the
same retarding factors that were given appreci-
able weight in previous forecasts.
FOMC members were concerned about the re-
cent developments in the measures of confidence,
but “generally concluded that the available eco-
nomic data appeared consistent with continuing,
albeit sluggish, expansion in overall economic
activity.” Some commented that the measures
of business and consumer sentiment “had to be
viewed with caution because they had tended in
the past to be coincident rather than leading in-
dicators of economic activity.” In terms of
downside risk, several members indicated con-
cern for “the vulnerability of the expansion
stemming from the troubled condition of many
financial institutions,” while others felt risks
were symmetric or even on the upside.” Some
members noted that any potential downturn
was expected to be confined to the fourth
quarter of 1991 or the first quarter of 1992 and
that “a resumption of growth next year. --
[was] a teasonable expectation.” Given the
lags associated with short-run policy actions,
these members believed that stimnulus already in
the economy should be given a chance to take
effect, and any actions taken to stimulate real
activity within the quarter might be viewed as
somewhat late.”
At the end of the meeting, a majority of the
voting members supported a proposal to ease
immediately and to bias the directive toward
further ease should conditions warrant. While
recognition that “monetary policy had been
eased considerably over the course of recent
months” was forthcoming from most members,
many felt that “further modest easing -. -
[might] provide somne added insurance” against a
decline in real output.” The majority felt that
additional easing would help bolster consumer
confidence and lead to further declines in key
long-term rates.’4’ The Record indicates that
there was “considerable” discussion of a proposal
to make “a somnewhat stronger move,” mainly
because “small moves would lack the visibili-
ty. --needed.”
A minority of members argued against sub-
stantial easing.” The notion that confidence
could be appreciably affected by monetary poli-
cy actions was questioned.’~~ Long-term interest
rates, it was argued, might well increase on a
substantial easing move, as fears of rekindled
inflation took hold among investors. Several
members also reiterated that several easing
steps recently taken should be allowed to work
through the economy before further action was
taken.’~’
Qfrf,7•fl~/ ci December .17, 1907
On November 6, the Board of Governors ap-
proved a 0.5 percentage-point reduction in the
discount rate, and a “slight easing” was carried
out in concert with this move.’4’ ‘rhe bias in the
November directive was acted upon in the inter-
meeting period, as “an additional slight easing”
was implemented in early December.” ‘Ihe se-
cond move was made, according to the Record,
“as economic indicators continued to point to a
faltering recovery and growth of the broad
monetary aggr’egates remained sluggish.”~’The
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action was also discussed “at some length,” as the
Treasury auction beginning the day of the FOMC meeting
would normally not be an appropriate time to intervene in
the market for reserves. In particular, an immediate action
could hurt the participants in the auction. Nevertheless,
the Committee did not wish to delay action, and the direc-
tive contained no delay.
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federal funds rate fell 0.5 percentage points be-
tween the November and the December meet-
ings, indicating substantial ease. l’he 13-week
M2 growth rates continued to accelerate during
the intermeeting period, as illustrated in figure
a, also indicating a relatively easy policy. Similar
interpretations are possible for intermeeting to-
tal reserve growth, which, while down somewhat
from the previous meeting, was still robust.
Growth in real output appeared at this meet-
ing to be slow and perhaps waning.” Dept-essed
levels of business and consumer confidence, a fall
in November industrial production and weakness
in consumption expenditures led the Board staff
to suggest, according to the Record, that “a
pause in the recovery. -- might extend into early
1992.” Faster growth was expected to return
at that time in part because of “the cumulative
effects of declines in intem’est rates in recent
months.” The staff felt that key sources of
growth would be provided by “increases in
residential construction, somewhat larger con-
sumption expenditures and some pick-up in busi-
ness equipment spending.” Restrictive fiscal
policy was still viewed as a key element retarding
growth relative to what expectations might tvar-
rant based on historical relationships in past
recoveries.”
The members seemed to agree with the staff
that past policy actions would eventually lead to
increased growth and that “the economy might
well remain quite sluggish over the months im-
mediately ahead.” Focus was placed on the
“evident pause in the business recovery and its
interaction with very gloomy business and con-
sumer sentiment.” Factors that had been pre-
viously identified as dampening growth “had in
fact proved to be stronger and more persistent
than anticipated.” The measures of sentiment
combined with some anecdotal reports on busi-
ness confidence received “considerable empha-
sis” in the Committee’s deliberations, although
the reasons behind the dismal attitudes were
“difficult to ascertain.” Growth in the mone-
tary aggm’egates was viewed as a positive sign by
some members.”
In the discussion of short-term policy for the
period immediately ahead, the Committee sup-
ported a directive that left unchanged the policy
stance for the time being, but which contained
an “especially strong presumption” that an eas-
ing action would he necessary, “unless improve-
ment in the economy became evident fairly
promptly or there was significant evidence of a
pick-up in Ma growth.” Some members again
argued for “a more substantial policy move at
some point.” They hoped that “a larger and
more visible policy action. -- would have greater
effectiveness in part because it would be more
likely to bolster confidence.”
Other members argued for more deliberate
policymaking.” According to the Record, they
“expressed reservations about the urgency to
ease in the near term” and suggested that
“monetary policy could do little” to alter the fac-
tors that were restraining the economy at this
point.” In this minority view, the fact that the
extent of recent easing actions was substantial
and the effects on real output were yet to be
realized was given a good deal of weight.
Any easing action needed to be coordinated
with the Board’s approach to the discount rate.
On December 20, the Board voted to move the
discount rate down by a full percentage point.
The FOMC then considered, in a telephone con-
ference, reactions to the move and decided to
allow part of the cut to show through to the
federal funds rate.”4 As shown in figure 1, the
funds rate fell below 4 percent on a weekly
average basis by the end of the yeam’.
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In 1991, the FOMC operated in an environ-
ment in which growth in real output was
resuming. This paper has therefore provided a
case study of the making of monetary policy
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“February pressRelative to past cyclical upswings in economic
activity, growth in 1991 was slow, and the
recovery itself seemed at times elusive.
‘rhe Comnmittee states its objectives on a regu-
lar basis, and members support policy actions
primarily based on their assessment of the out-
look for inflation and real output. Since growth
in economic activity was sluggish in 1991 and
since inflation was low by recent standards, the
Committee’s objective of sustaining real output
growth played a predominant role. Repeatedly,
members wrestled with arguments about the
lagged effects of monetary policy actions, noting
that if the economy had bottomed out, easing to
mitigate real output declines would be unneces-
sary. Still, at times, incoming data seemed to
suggest a renewed decline in economic activity,
and the Committee took actions throughout the
year in the hope of avoiding this possibility.
Measuring the thrust of monetary policy at a
point in time was a continual topic of discussion
at FOMC meetings in 1991. While the federal
funds rate played a dominant role in this capac-
ity, the Committee devoted a considerable
amount of time to analyses of M2 growth, which
seemed to falter at times during the year. In
general, conflicting signals of the thrust of mnon-
etary policy played a significant role in Commit-
tee deliberations.
During the first half of 1991, the FOMC dis-
played considerable optimism that a recovery
would begin and gain momentum as the year
progressed. Three of the first four directives of
the year called for an unchanged policy without
bias, although, as indicated in the chronology
and table 1, some easing was implemented dur-
ing this period. Beginning about August, how-
ever, the Committee’s confidence in the recovery
began to wane. The four directives issued in the
second half of the year all contained bias
toward ease, as Committee members expressed
deep concern about declines in industrial
production and consumer confidence. By the
end of the year, the FOMC had approved a
number of easing actions designed to provide
insurance against further declines in real output.
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